Introduction
"Danish civilization," writes Thorleifr Gudmunson Repp in 1845, in the preface to the first lexicographically defensible Danish-English Dictionary, is in fact in every particular essentially German, and Denmark has for ages become so much accustomed to German dictature and supremacy in intellectual matters, that an emancipation from it would be suicidal to Danish culture and entirely check the progress of enlightenment in Denmark. … Danish civilization and literature accordingly are subject to, and must for all time to come be perpetually subject to German influence.
… If owing to physical as well as moral causes, Denmark is a kind of Galilee to Germany (Germany being considered as Palestine), that circumstance must never be lost sight of by any one who treats of its language, its literature, or its history. 1 The influence of Germany on Danish culture rarely was lost sight of in Kierkegaard's day. Danes were deeply ambivalent about their relation to Germany. On the one hand, they looked up to Germany as more cultured and cultivated than provincial Denmark, but on the other Danes were fiercely determined to assert their own national character over and against that of the Germans. Kierkegaard, made merciless fun of his compatriots, whom he felt would sometimes "speak in German" because of their inability to "speak philosophically."
2 He often appears to ridicule Germans, but closer inspection of these passages generally reveals that his true target is Danes. He pokes fun in, for example, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, of the German "assistant professor," but in commenting on a review of the Postscript, he observes: It is an extraordinary word; I envy the Germans for having it …
The Germans have the word because there is such continual use for it in Germany.
We Danes do not have the word, but that which the word designates is not Mystics, Ames explains, are not "troubled by the question of the existence or the reality of God." 10 The passion of the mystic is, rather, "to find God, to ascend to his presence, to enter into communion with him." 11 That is, the craving of the mystic is "to secure a vital and satisfying relation with the supreme reality." 12 Yet to the extent that the supreme reality "is in no way conditioned," After doing his utmost to earn it, or achieve it, the greatest need is that he shall be passive and receptive."
14
In order to understand, however, how such "passivity" and "receptivity" concerned not merely to discredit the gnostics, who, in Lillas's words "sharply distinguished the pistis of the common believers from the higher gnosis which, according to them, was a natural gift bestowed as a privilege to only a very few persons, the πνευµατικοι" (Lilla, 118-19), 19 but also to defend Christianity against the accusations of Greek philosophers that it represented an irrational faith, a faith that offered no higher knowledge of the truth.
Man's aim, according to Clement, "is to know God, to have knowledge of God (γνωσις του Θεου): 'We call upon man,'" writes Clement, "'who was made for the contemplation of heaven, and is in truth a heavenly plant, to come to knowledge of God (Protr. 100.3).'" 20 There are two respects, however, in which one can "know" God. But how does faith result in knowledge? Ames is correct in his claim that "mystic illumination cannot be scientifically or systematically induced," that the subject … receives it passively, after doing his utmost to earn it, or to achieve it." 23 The answer is that faith is a gift of Grace to those who seek earnestly to attain it. It is the "condition," as Kierkegaard expresses it in Philosophical
Crumbs, that one who has surrendered his understanding receives from "the god," and which then conditions his understanding of the truth.
II. The Epistemology of the German Mystics
Meister Eckhart was born around 1260, and Johannes Tauler as conveying a knowledge of religious truth. 25 The reference to "an inward sight" that bears a striking resemblance to Irenaeus' "mental intuition," occurs also in 
IV. Kierkegaard's Religious Epistemology
Some mystics, observes Kierkegaard, "think they have a direct relation to God and thus will not acknowledge that all human beings have only an indirect relation ([through] the Church- [or] in the political domain, the state). 49 The view that one can have a direct relation to God is, of course, problematic for Christianity in that it would appear to make Christ superfluous. There is a sense according to Kierkegaard, however, despite this early reference to the contrary, in which human beings are directly related to God, a sense that is entirely consistent with the Christian tradition.
The first indication we have that Kierkegaard is a kindred spirit of mysticism is the fact that, to use Ames' words, "he is not troubled by the question of the existence or reality of God." 50 He takes these for granted. Kierkegaard appears to hold the view, in keeping with first the Church fathers and then the German mystics that human beings have something like innate knowledge that there is a God. Arild Christensen argues, for example, that Kierkegaard "emphasizes that God is present in human consciousness" 51 and Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes de silentio refers to human beings as having an "eternal consciousness" that he associates with the love of God. 52 It would appear
Kierkegaard believes the idea of God is built into human consciousness.
Precisely how this is so is something he doesn't directly address. It seems safe to assume that it is simply part of the way consciousness is constructed. 53 It might be associated with a person's appreciation that his is a finite, or limited, form of rationality, or it might be roughly equivalent to a kind of Schleiermachean feeling of absolute dependence.
"Eternally understood," asserts Kierkegaard in Philosophical Crumbs, "one does not believe that there is a God, even though one assumes that there is.
This is a misuse of language. Socrates did not have faith that there was a God.
What he knew about God he achieved through recollection" (C, 153). This reference to "recollection" recurs in Kierkegaard's journals where he observes that both proving that there is a God, and being convinced of this by proofs, are "equally fantastic,"
for just as no one has ever proven it, so has there never been an atheist, ). Yet he also claims that faith is a risky venture and if it is a risky venture, it would appear problematic to argue that a person could attain certainty as a result of it. "Risking," Kierkegaard argues, "is the correlative of uncertainty, once certainty is there, risking stops" (CUP, 356).
The certainty of faith is accessible, however, only in the moment of faith and thus cannot represent a threat to faith itself. The instant a person ceases to believe in the sense that he ceases to be in the passion of faith, the certainty vanishes and to renew faith involves risk in the same sense it did the first time.
Thus the certainty of faith, according to Kierkegaard, "has in it, at every moment, the infinite dialectic of uncertainty" (CUP, 48) not merely in the sense that the object of faith appears objectively uncertain, but also in the sense that faith itself is difficult to sustain.
But the certainty of faith is in no sense arbitrary. It's a consequence of the believer's contact with God's infinite love in the moment of faith. The original Greek expression that was translated into Danish as "kiende"
and then retranslated by Kierkegaard as "erfarer" is γνωσεται which comes from the Greek γνωσις. Christ is an experience that is related to the intellect in a manner analogous to the way sense experience is related to the intellect.
Experience, according to Kierkegaard, belongs to the realm of existence, or actuality, hence it cannot, in itself, be equivalent to knowledge (which is why, according to Kierkegaard, it cannot be deceptive). Experience becomes knowledge, or a candidate for knowledge, when it is brought into relation to ideality in the intellect. Hence Christian knowledge, in the propositional sense, is a consequence of, rather than, as some have argued, equivalent to, Christian experience. 63 "Knowing the truth," argues Kierkegaard in Practice in Christianity,
is not equivalent to being the truth, but is something that "follows of itself from being the truth" (PC, 205). Yes, purgation, or dying to the self, is important in Kierkegaard's authorship, but only as a means to the end of establishing the proper relation to the truth, which relation is a complex dialectic of illumination (i.e., kendskab), union, and further illumination (viden/erkendelsen), just as it is for both Eckhart and Tauler.
Much more work remains to be done on Kierkegaard's relation to German mysticism, and indeed, on his relation to German thought more generally. It ought to be clear, however, from this brief examination of the influence of German mysticism on Kierkegaard that not all Germans, according to Kierkegaard, were "windbags." Some had very important things to say, things which were influential on the formation of Kierkegaard's own thought. 
